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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
MARY A. MURPHY, dba ALEX PICKERING
TRANSFER COMPANY, and PICKERING
TRANSFER COMPANY, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, REDMAN VAN & STORAGE
COMPANY, BARTON TRUCK LINE, INC.,
UINTAH FREIGHTWAYS, MAGNA-GARFIELD TRUCK LINE, PALMER BROTHERS, INC., RIO GRANDE MOTOR WAY,
INC., MILNE TRUCK LINES, INC.,
ASHWORTH TRANSFER, INC., BILLS
MOVING, INC., A-ONE MOVING AND
DELIVERY, LEWIS BROS. STAGE LINES
and UTAH PACKAGE EXPRESS, INC.,
Defendants.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS
NATURE OF CASE
This is an original action brought in this Court pursuant
to §54-7-16, U.C.A. 1953, to review an order of defendant
Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission") which
denied plaintiffs' application to transfer a motor carrier
contract permit and certificate of convenience and necessity.
1
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DISPOSITION BELOW
The Commission's Order of October 30, 1974,
(Commission Case No. 6750) denied plaintiffs' Application to
transfer Contract Carrier Permit No. 130 and Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity No. 684 sub 1 from plaintiff
Murphy to her wholly owned corporation, plaintiff Pickering
(R. 54-7).
RELIEF SOUGHT
Plaintiffs pray that the Commission's Order of October
30, 1974, be reversed and remanded with direction that the
Commission approve plaintiffs' Application for transfer, and
that plaintiffs be awarded their costs from the other defendant
carriers.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Murphy is a 92 year old widow who succeeded,
pursuant to the Commission's Order of November 17, 1954, to
the common and contract carrier rights of her deceased
husband, John M. Murphy, issued May 16, 1936, and she now
holds Contract Carrier Permit No. 130, issued by the
Commission, authorizing her:
"To operate as a contract motor carrier of all kinds of
personal property, including merchandise, machinery
and other property which she has occasion to carry in
the course of the conduct of her transportation business
within a 50-mile radius of Salt Lake City, excluding
pickup and delivery service within the area described
in Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 684",
and she now holds Certificate of Convenience and Necessity
No. 684 sub 1, issued by the Commission, authorizing her:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law2Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"To operate between all points and places in Salt Lake
County and all points and places in Davis County south
of the junction of U.S. Highways 89 and 91 just north of
Farmington, Utah, but excluding from said area that
portion of Salt Lake County which is both west of 4800
West and south of 1300 South, but including the town of
Kearns, Utah." (R. 57)
In Murphy v. Public Service Commission, 30 U.2d 140,
514 P.2d 804 (1972), this Court interpreted the foregoing
Contract Carrier Permit to hold it is a general permit "not
limited to a particular contract nor to hauling for a particular
person." In so holding, this Court vacated the Commission's
Order of July 10, 1972, in the Commission's Case No. 1863 (R.
79-84, Special Record), which had held upon complaint filed by
all of the carriers who are defendants in this action, that
(1) the contract carrier authority granted Mrs.
Murphy in 1954 was limited to those two shippers,
Campbell Soup and Industrial Supply, for whom she had
filed contracts in 1954;
(2) that in order to serve additional shippers for
whom she filed contracts in March, 1972, she must first
comply with §54-6-8, U.C.A. 1953, in the same manner as
if she were applying for a new contract carrier permit, by
having the Commission determine, after notice and
hearing, that the highways over which she would operate
are not unduly burdened, that the granting of the
application will not unduly interfere with the traveling
public and will not be detrimental to the best interests of
the public, and that existing transportation facilities do
not provide reasonable or adequate service; and
(3) that plaintiffs' failure to provide service for
Industrial Supply constituted a forfeiture of right to
reinstitute service without showing the service was
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necessary or that she was not responsible for failure to
give service.
Plaintiff Pickering Transfer Company, Inc. is a Utah
corporation, all of whose stock is owned by plaintiff Murphy
(R. 2, 76, 161-2, 198). The other named defendants hold
authority, from defendant Public Service Commission to
operate as common motor carriers of property pursuant to
certificates of convenience and necessity issued to them,
which includes the carriage of property within the area
encompassed in plaintiffs common and contract carrier
authority, all of whom protested plaintiffs' subject transfer
Application.
On February 8, ,1973, plaintiffs Murphy and Pickering
jointly executed and filed Application (R. 1-4) with the
Commission which generally set out that:
(a) Plaintiff Murphy holds the Common Carrier
Certificate and Contract Carrier Permit as aforesaid.
(b) Pickering Transfer Company, Inc. is a newly
organized Utah corporation, all of whose stock is owned
by plaintiff Murphy.
(c) On March 1, 1972, plaintiff Murphy executed a
written agreement, a copy of which was attached to the
Application (R. 5-10), with Max W. Young, by which it
was agreed:
(i) After February 1, 1972, Mr. Young would
manage Pickering Transfer Company for his own
account;
(ii) Pickering Transfer Company, Inc. would be
formed and all of its stock would be issued to plaintiff
Murphy;
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law4Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(iii) Application would be filed with the
Commission for approval of transfer of said Certificate and Permit to Pickering Transfer Company,
Inc.; and
(iv) Upon such approval, Mr. Young would
purchase all of the stock of Pickering Transfer
Company, Inc. and certain detailed equipment for
$23,400, if the Commission approved the transfer of
the Certificate and Permit, or $13,400 if only the
Certificate transfer were approved, all on the terms
and conditions set out in said agreement.
(d) Plaintiff Murphy is 89 years old and it is
necessary and desirable for her to sell her business.
Pickering Transfer Company, Inc. is fit, willing and able
to render said service and the public interest will not be
adversely affected by granting the application for
transfer of both the Certificate and Permit.
That same agreement of February 1, 1972, was before the
Commission as Exhibit 1 in the prior Case No. 1863 (Ex. 1,
Vol. 2, Special Record).
Hearing on the transfer application in Commission Case
No. 6750 was held before the Commission on April 6, 1973. At
that time the Commission's prior 1972 orders in Case No. 1863
were in effect and on appeal. Defendant carriers appeared and
did not protest transfer of the Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity, but did protest transfer of the Contract Carrier
Permit. The record reflects (R. 159) defendants' counsel said:
"Mr. Richards: We are not challenging the Common
Carrier cartage Permit. I am sure that it is active and
all of the criteria exist for a valid transfer.
"Miss Warr: My clients have instructed me not to
oppose any transfer of Mrs. Murphy's Certificate of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Convenience and Necessity with respect to cartage
service."
Both defense counsel stated their sole interest was as to the
extent of Murphy's contract service for Campbell Soup
Company since Murphy was not then serving Industrial
Supply, so that if Murphy was not then serving Campbell
Soup Company, there would be "no contract carrier authority
subject to transfer" (R. 159-60). All parties stipulated that the
Application to transfer the Contract Carrier Permit would be
subject to this Court's determination in Case No. 1863 then on
appeal as to the extent of the Contract Carrier Permit itself
(R. 158-61).
Both plaintiffs subscribed to the facts stated in the
Application, as aforesaid, including the agreement that the
Certificate and Permit would be transferred to the
corporation, subject to Commission approval. Max W. Young,
who joined in the Application, testified to all of the facts
contained in the Application, as recited above, without
objection or contradiction (R. 161-2). Detailed evidence was
admitted as to the transferee corporation's financial condition
and the operating equipment it would have (Ex. 1-3, R. 66-7,
197-8), showing a net worth of $23,896 and nine vehicles, and
no issue was made by any defendants that such was
inadequate. Mr. Young, who would become the transferee
corporation's executive officer, testified he was willing to
conform to Commission rules and regulations in operating the
business, and when asked to tell his experience, defense
counsel said:
"I am not going to challenge Mr. Young's experience
in the motor carrier business — he is a very
knowledgeable experienced individual in the
business, per se" (R. 188-9).
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Defendants crossexamined only as to the extent of
service to Campbell Soup Company and put on no evidence of
their own or contradictory evidence to plaintiffs' case. All
parties rested and the Commission took the matter under
advisement.
In October, 1973, this Court's decision in Murphy v,
PSCU, supra, was handed down in the Commission's Case No.
1863. Defendant carriers petitioned the Commission to reopen
this case (R. 21-4), and over plaintiffs' objection (R. 27-31), the
Commission reopened the case for hearing on July 26,1974 (R.
52). The Commission took notice of the proceedings in Case
No. 1863 (three special volumes in this record), and this
Court's decision thereon (R. 214). Defendants proposed to put
on testimony that each carrier has made a substantial
investment in plant and equipment to serve thfe territory
involved in plaintiffs' contract carrier permit, that each
depends upon traffic originating within that territory to
support the remaining territory served and that each would
be materially and adversely affected if the Permit were
transferred. Plaintiffs objected to the admission of additional
testimony on the grounds that no showing had been made as
to need or basis, such as surprise, fraud, mistake or newly
discovery evidence, for taking additional evidence when it was
not offered at the first hearing (R. 209, 212-3, 218,222),'and
objected that such testimony would be immaterial and
irrelevant to the issues before the Commission on transfer,
and that it was pure incompetent, self-serving speculation
that the defendant carriers would be affected by the transfer
(R. 219, 222). The Commission was not in position to rule upon
plaintiffs' objections and took them under advisement (R. 221)
and so, subject to those objections and rulings thereon, the
parties stipulated that if each defendant carrier called a
witness, the witness would so testify (R 222), The
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Commission took notice of plaintiff Murphy's annual reports
and shipper contracts filed with the Commission (R. 88-153,
223) which clearly show an operating, functional business. The
parties again rested and the case was again taken under
advisement.
On October 30, 1974, the Commission made and entered
its Report and Order (R. 54-6) which concluded that before
transfer of plaintiff Murphy's Contract Carrier Permit to her
wholly owned corporation could be approved, she must first
prove that existing transportation facilities do not provide
reasonable and adequate service in the same manner as one
applying for issuance of a new contract carrier permit under
§54-6-8, U.C.A. 1953, and denied the Application for transfer
of the Contract Carrier Permit. The Commission made no
finding or conclusion that plaintiff Pickering Transfer
Company, Inc. was not fit, ready, willing and able to operate
either or both the Certificate or Permit, but concluded that it
could not be determined if the transferee is ready, willing and
able to operate the Certificate exclusive of the Permit, nor
could contractual basis be found to determine the value of the
Certificate independent of the value of the Permit, and for
those sole reasons, denied the Application to transfer the
Certificate without prejudice to reapplication to transfer the
Certificate alone.
Plaintiffs filed timely Petition for Rehearing (R. 58-60),
and upon its denial (R. 64), filed timely Complaint before this
Court which issued appropriate writ of review.
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AlUUIMfiNT
POINT I. 1WE COMMISSION ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE MUST BE PROOF THAT
EXISTING
TRANSPORTATION
FACILITIES
ARE
INADEQUATE
BEFORE A GENERAL
CONTRACT
PERMIT MA Y BE TRANSFERRED,
The Commission concluded in its Report and Order (R.
56):
**Rule No. 3 of the Motor Carrier Rules and
Regulations, (1937), which rule specifically deals
with permits, expressly provides: the person
desiring to assume said operating rights shall comply
with the provisions of Chapter 65, Laws of Utah,
1935, as in filing for a new permit; . . . Additionally,
applicants must demonstrate that
existing
transportation facilities do not provide adequate or
reasonable service. Applicants have not met their
burden of proof and the transfer of the contract
carrier permit . . . should be denied,'
rhis was the critical issue before the Commission, that is,
in a contract carrier transfer application, as opposed to an
application to issue a new contract carrier permit, must the
applicant prove that existing transportation service is
inadequate? Clearly, in application for a new permit, there
must now be such proof. Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, did
not originally so require, but in 1945 the statute was amended
to add that requirement. Existing case law [Colleti v. Public
Service Comm,t 116 Ut. 406, 211 P.2d 185 (1949); Morris v.
Public Service Commission, 7 U.2d 167, 321 P.2d 644 (1958) ],
makes it clear that in case of application to transfer a common
carrier certificate, proof of public convenience and necessity is
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not an element of proof, as it is on application for a new
certificate, because that issue was decided when the
certificate was first issued so that the only important question
on transfer is the qualification of the proposed transferee. Is
the law any different in applications to transfer contract
carrier permits?
Transfer applications are normally routine, since by logic
and case law the questions of public need for the carrier
service and correlative adequacy of existing service were
decided when the certificate of convenience and necessity, in
the case of a common carrier, or permit, in the case of a
contract carrier, was first issued, leaving at issue on later
application to transfer only questions of the transferee's
financial ability, equipment, experience, fitness, willingness
and ability to serve and the resulting effect on the public if the
transfer is approved.
In CoUett v. Public Service Commission, supra, Gould
applied to transfer his certificate to Lang. Existing carriers
protested and contended applicants were under the duty to
show that public convenience and necessity require the
service sought to be rendered by Lang. The Commission
determined:
" . . . This Commission has determined in a prior
proceeding that public convenience and necessity
require the services which Gould is authorized to
perform under said Certificate. Lang proposes
simply that he be authorized to enjoy the rights and
discharge the obligations and duties of Gould. Lang
seeks the right to perform those services which
Gould is presently authorized to perform, nothing
more. It having been determined by this Commission

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 10
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that public convenience and necessity require such
services, that question is not an issue in this case and
need not be again determined. The motor carrier
rules and regulations of this Commission now and
since June 1,1937, in force and effect so provide; and
the procedure of this Commission in cases such as
this has been consistently in accordance therewith."

This Court affirmed saying:
"It would seem reasonable to believe from the
following facts that public convenience and necessity
does now exist for the continuance of the service contemplated: An increase in carrier service is not
contemplated by the application; only a substitution
of certificate holders is contemplated; and public
convenience and necessity has once been decided as
existing, and has been recognized as continuing to
exist to the present time by continuous exercise by
Gould of his certificate rights, which had not been
revoked prior to this hearing. The only important
question under such circumstances is that of the
qualification of the prospective new certificate holder
to render the necessary public services. The question
as to whether or not the opportunity to hold the
newly issued certificate should be offered to existing
certificate holders rather than a stranger is more a
question of private interests than a question of public
interest. If the Commission were restricted to
present certificate holders, it might have a rather
serious injurious effect upon the carrier who wishes
to abandon his certificate and retire from business.
His years spent in working up a good will would jtet
him nothing, as no one would be interested in taking
over where he leaves off. . ."

11 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"The Commission took the view, that the
principal question in such a problem as this is that of
the financial status, fitness, willingness and ability of
the proposed new certificate holder to carry on the
business; that so far as the public is concerned, the
public convenience and necessity would not be
adversely affected by the change in certificate
holders. The protestants made no effort to show that
conditions had so changed that there was no
necessity for Gould to continue in business. They
really fear the competition of the Lang Company —
that it will adversely affect their business — a matter
that did not seem to bother them so long as Gould
remained in business. . . . "

"As to the matter of competition so emphatically
emphasized by counsel for the protestants, we should
not overlook the fact that in this case we are not
dealing with an application, the granting of which,
will increase the number of competitors in the field,
and thus jeopardize the service to the public. We are
dealing with merely a substitution of one carrier for
another. . . ."
(Emphasis added)
In Morris v. Public Service Commission, supra, Watson
applied to the Commission to transfer his certificate to Morris.
Without giving notice that cancellation of the certificate would
be considered at the hearing, the Commission denied the
transfer application and cancelled the certificate. This Court
reversed, saying:
"Also the question of public convenience or necessity
is not questioned in transfer cases since it is
presumed such necessity was determined when the
original certificate of convenience and necessity was
issued. . . . "
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law12
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"The purpose in proceedings as the one at bar
have been described in the case of Collett v. Public
Service Commission. There speaking of the cancellation and reissuance of a* certificate of convenience and
necessity to another party the court said:
4

* * * that the principal question in such a problem as this is that of the financial status,
fitness, willingness and ability of the proposed
new certificate holder to carry on the business:
that so far as the public is concerned, the public
convenience and necessity would not be
adversely affected by the change in certificate
holders.'
"The Commission failed to make a finding as to
the fitness of Morris, financially or otherwise, to
assume Watson's certificate. There is-no reference
made to Morris as to his qualifications, his
equipment, willingness or the resulting effects to the
public if the application were granted. In other
words, the Commission has not indicated any reason
for denying Morris' application because of Morris'
position or shortcomings.
"The Commission's denial of the Morris application was based solely on the conclusion that the
Watson certificate should be cancelled — a matter
not properly before it.
"The Commission's order are set aside and the
case is remanded for action in conformity with this
opinion."
Logic compels the same rule be applied for transfer of
permits, for the showing that "existing transportation
facilities do not provide adequate or reasonable service"
required by §54-6-8, U.C.A. 1953 on applications for new
13J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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contract carrier permits, was made and found existing when
the permit was first issued, and has been recognized as
continuing to exist to the present time by plaintiff Murphy's
continuous exercise of her contract rights to time of hearing.
The transferee corporation proposes only to assume her
existing authority, nothing more. There cannot be an increase
in carrier service as no change in the scope of authorized
service is requested. Therefore, pursuant to the Collett case,
"the only important question is the qualification of the
prospective . . . holder to render the necessary public
services."
There is absolutely no case law or logic to support
reasoning that on a contract transfer application, applicants
must prove a new issue case. The Commission certainly did
not require such proof in the 1954 hearing on Case No. 2945
when the Contract Carrier Permit was transferred to Mrs.
Murphy from her deceased husband's estate (Special Record
R. 97-102), and there is no evidence that the Commission has
ever required such proof in the past.
At the first hearing on April 6, 1973, defendant carriers
stated the sole issue was whether Mrs. Murphy was
transporting as a contract carrier for Campbell Soup
Company, arguing that if she was not, then there would be no
contract carrier authority available to transfer; nevertheless,
all parties stipulated that the Contract Carrier Permit
transfer Application was subject to this Court's determination
as to the extent of the Permit (R. 159-61). In Murphy v. Public
Service Commission, supra, this Court held in October, 1973,
that the Permit was general so that Mr. Murphy could enter
into new contracts without obtaining Commission approval
and without proving to the Commission that existing carrier
service was inadequate. The necessary result of that decision
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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was that Mrs. Murphy did have contract carrier authority
extant under her Permit, regardless of whether or not she
was then serving Campbell Soup Company, including the right
to serve General Electric and Certified Warehouse, for whom
she filed contracts in April, 1972 (R. 149-52) but which the
Commission had ordered her to desist from serving, as well as
the right to enter into new contracts. Notwithstanding that
decision and defendants' stipulation, accepted by the
Commission at the first hearing (R. 159-61), that the transfer
Application was subject to that decision, defendants argued at
the second hearing that Mrs. Murphy still must prove that
existing carrier service is inadequate before the Permit may
be transferred. Defendants argued to the Commission:
"But there again I'm not going to urge the
Commission in this proceeding to take the authority
that is now held by Mary A. Murphy and cancel that
authority or in any way alter or amend it in this
proceeding. My whole position is that you cannot
transfer it to that corporation or to any other person
without the Applicants for transfer first making the
showing as required by the statutes and by your own
rules."
Defendants' only position is a technical argument that
Rule 3 of the Commission's Motor Carrier Rules and
Regulations, promulgated June 1, 1937, dealing with transfer
of. permits, provides "the person desiring to assume said
operating rights shall comply with the provisions of Chapter
65, Laws of Utah, 1935, as in filing for a new permit", whereas
Rule 2, dealing with transfer of certificates of convenience and
necessity provide that the applicants "will not be required to
prove convenience and necessity".
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, required applicants for
new certificates of convenience and necessity to prove the
public convenience and necessity required issuance of the
certificate, but no such or similar requirement was then
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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placed upon applicants for contract carrier permits. It was not
until 1945 that Chapter 105, Laws of Utah, 1945, added to the
existing statute (76-5-21, U.C.A. 1943) that applicants for new
contract carrier permits must prove "the existing
transportation facilities do not provide adequate or reasonable
service."
Thus, Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, provided:
"Section 6. Certificate
Necessity.

of

Convenience

and

" . . . The commission, upon the filing of an application
for such certificate, shall fix a time and place for
hearing thereon, ...Ifthe commissionfindsfrom the
evidence that the public convenience and necessity
require the proposed service or any part thereof it
may issue the certificate as prayed for, or issue it for
the partial exercise only of the privilege sought, and
may attach to the exercise of the right granted by
such certificate such terms and conditions as in its
judgment the public convenience and necessity may
require, otherwise such certificate shall be denied.
Before granting a certificate to a common motor
carrier,"the commission shall take into consideration
the financial ability of the applicant to properly
perform the service sought under the certificate and
also the character of the highway over which said
common motor carrier proposes to operate and the
effect thereon, and upon the traveling public using
the same, and also the existing transportation
facilities in the territory proposed to be served. If the
commission finds that the applicant is financially
unable to properly perform the service sought under
the certificate, or that the highway over which he
proposes to operate is already sufficiently burdened
with traffic, or that the granting of the certificate
applied for will be detrimental to the best interests of
the people of the state 6i Utah, the commission shall
not grant such certificate."
(Emphasis added)
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* * *
' "Section 9. Contract Carrier Permit.
"The commission upon the filing of an application
for a contract motor carrier's permit by any other
person than those referred to above in this section
(meaning prior contract carriers) shall fix a time and
place for hearing thereon and shall give the same
notice as provided in section 6 hereof
If, from all
the testimony offered at said hearing, the
commission shall determine that the highways over
which the applicant desires to operate are not unduly
burdened; that the granting of the application will
not unduly interfere with the traveling public; and
that the granting of the application will not be detrimental to the best interests of the people of the state
of Utah and/or to the localities to be served, the
commission shall grant such permit..." (parentheses
ours)
Section 9 of the Laws of 1935, as quoted, became Section
76-5-21, U.C.A. 1943. Chapter 105, Laws of Utah, 1945,
provided:
"Section 3. Section Amended.
Section 76-5-21 Utah Code Annotated 1943 is
amended to read:
"76-5-21. Contract Carrier—Intrastate CommercePermit.
* * *
"The commission upon the filing of an application
for a contract motor carrier's permit shall fix a time
and place for hearing thereon and may give the same
17J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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notice as provided in section 76-5-18 hereof. If, from
all the testimony offered at said hearing, the
commission shall determine that the highways over
which the applicant desires to operate are not unduly
burdened; that the granting of the application will
not unduly interfere with the traveling public; and
that the granting of the application will not be
detrimental to the best interests of the people of the
state of Utah and/or to the localities to be served,
and if the existing transportation facilities do not
provide adequate or reasonable service,
the
commission shall grant such permit, "(emphasis
added)
The law has not since been amended. Section 54-Q-8, U.C.A.
1953, is as last quoted. The history of amendments to the Utah
Motor Vehicle Act is traced in Rowley v. Public Service
Commission, 112 Utah 116, 185 P.2d 514 (1947).
The Commission erred in concluding that the 1945
amendment was incorporated into Commission Rule No. 3.
Rule No. 3 refers only to Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, and
not to subsequent amendments thereto. The same rules of
construction and interpretation govern the construction and
interpretation of administrative rules as apply to statutes; M.
Kraus & Bros. v. U.S., 327 U.S. 614, 9ft L.Ed. 894, 66 S.Ct.
705; 2 Am. Jur.2d, Administrative Law, §307, p. 135 City of
Seattle v. Green, 51 Wash.2d 871, 322 P.2d 842, 844 (1958)
holds:
"The general rule is that when a statute is adopted
by specific descriptive reference, the adoption takes
the statute as it exists at that time, without subsequent amendments, but when the language of the
adopting act evidence legislative intent to include
subsequent amendments, courts will give effect to
that intent."
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See also Poison Logging Co. v U.S., 160 F.2d 712 (C.A. 9th,
1947). State v. Dobson, 169 Ore. 546, 130 P.2d 939 (1942),
cited the rule saying:
"This is for the reason that the adopting statute
'means the law as existing at the time of the
adoption, and does not adopt any subsequent
addition thereto or modification thereto'. Endlich,
Interpretation of Statutes, p. 115, §85, p. 312 §233."
Thus, Commission Rule 3, promulgated in 1937 as to the Laws
of 1935, did not adopt the 1945 statutory amendment.
" . . . Even where two acts are not in express terms
repugnant, yet if the latter act covers the whole
subject of the first, and embraces new provisions,
plainly showing it was intended as a substitute for
the first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act."
Dist. of Columbia v. Button, 143 U.S. 18, 27,12 S.Ct.
369, 372, 36 L.Ed. 60.
Here, the 1945 amendment covered the whole subject of new
contract carrier applications and embraced the new
requirement of showing inadequacy of existing service,
repealing Commission Rule 3 to the extent the latter might be
construed to require showing of inadequacy of existing
contract carrier service on transfer applications.
In Rowley v. Public Service Commission, s%pray this
Court approved this quotation from Sutherland on Statutory
Construction, §241, p. 320:
"In the exposition of a statute the intention of
the lawmaker will prevail over the literal sense of the
terms; and its reason and intention will prevail over
the strict letter. When the words are not explicit the
intention is to be collected from the context, from the
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occasion and necessity of the law; from the mischief
felt, and the remedy in view; and the intention is to
be taken or presumed according to what is consonant
with reason and good discretion."
Kesler & Sons Contraction Co. v. Utah State Division of
Health, 30 U.2d 90, 513 P.2d 1017 (1973) held:
u

We think the point where the court should refuse
enforcement of such an administrative regulation is
in accord with the usually applied rule of review and
control of administrative actions: Where it so clearly
transgresses beyond any reasonable justification in
relation to its purpose that it should be deemed
capricious and arbitrary."
Reason and logic compel application of the Cottett case,
supra, to this case. There simply is no reason why applicants
for transfer of permits should be required to prove inadequacy
of existing service when applicants for transfer of certificates
are not so required. Here is Mrs. Murphy, an aged widow,
who desires to sell her contract carrier permit. Now that she
wishes to retire from business, she and her husband having
spent years in working up good will, is she to net nothing,
which would be the result, if she now has to prove that
existing carrier service is inadequate. As noted in^Cantlay &
Tanzola v. Public Service Commission, 120 Utah 217, 233 P.2d
344 (1951), quoted on page 26 hereof, if existing services are
adequate, it is because plaintiff has been providing a portion of
the trucking service. It is obviously to the public interest, or
perhaps more accurately, to her contractees' interests, that
her contract carrier service be continued by a qualified
transferee. Likewise, it is obvious that defendant carriers'
protests arise only out of fear of continued competition;
indeed, that was the thrust of the only evidence that
defendant carriers offered, albeit immaterial and incompetent
speculation. Defendants' counsel said (R. 210):
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"Mr. Richards: . . . the evidence that I would
contemplate offering would be to put on the
witnesses . . . who will show the substantial adverse
effect that the transfer of this naked contract carrier
permit would have upon their existing operations."
As in Peterson v. Public Service Commission, 1 U.2d 324,
266 P.2d 497 (1954):
"Under §54-6-4, U.C.A. 1953, vesting in the Commission power to regulate motor carriers, we do not find
any authority either directly, or reasonably incident
thereto, by which the Commission could arbitrarily
refuse to approve a tariff, and, thus nullify the rights
a carrier possesses under a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity."
Thus, the Commission erred as a matter of law when it
concluded that plaintiffs "must demonstrate that existing
transportation facilities do not provide adequate or reasonable
service." The Commission should have concluded that such
proof is not required. Since the Commission denied the
transfer application upon the erroneous conclusion that
plaintiffs were required and failed to so prove, the Order
should be reversed.

POINT II. THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FINDING
THERE WAS NO CONTRACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS.
The Commission erred in Finding No. 2 that "per se there
is no contract between Murphy and the Corporation" (R. 55).
The contract between Murphy and Young, dated March 1,
1972, was admitted in evidence as Exhibit 4 (R. 68-73). By that
contract, the parties promised that the plaintiff transferee
corporation would be formed with all stock to be issued to
Mrs. Murphy (fl), that application would be filed with the
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Commission to transfer the contract carrier permit and
common carrier certificate to the corporation then to be
formed (18), and that Mrs. Murphy would fully cooperate in
the prosecution of the application (19). The corporation could
not join the agreement because it was not then formed, but
thereafter the corporation was formed (R. 76). The
Application herein, paragraph 5, recites the same contract
and its terms as aforesaid, and the corporation executed the
Application, thereby ratifying and confirming the contract
attached to the Application (R. 4). The Commission should
have found that Murphy and the corporation contracted that
her carrier certificate and permit would be transferred to the
corporation, subject to approval of the Commission.
Even if there were any deficiency in respect to the
agreement between the transferor and the transferee, it
would not make any difference to the granting of the
Application, since the corporate transferee joined in the
Application, and the Commission in its Conclusions did not
conclude any such deficiency had any effect on the denial of
the Application for transfer.
POINT III. THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING
TO MAKE FINDINGS OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AS
TO THE TRANSFEREE'S QUALIFICATIONS AND IN
FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT THE TRANSFEREE WAS
QUALIFIED.
The Commission erred in Finding No. 3 in reciting that
applicants' evidence consisted only of the Application (R. 1-4),
financial statements (R. 66-8), equipment list (R. 66A) and the
agreement (R. 68-73). Mr. Young testified, without
contradiction (R. 160-2):
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(a) Murphy is an 89 year old widow and it is
necessary and desirable for her to arrange sale and
transfer of the permit.
(b) Young is experienced in the motor carrier
business and will be active in the day-to-day operations of
the corporation's business as its principal shareholder and
president if the Application is approved. He is financially
able to capitalize the corporation so that it will be in sound
operating condition to render the service involved in the
Certificate and Permit.
(c) The plaintiff corporation is financially able to
render the service authorized by the Certificate and
Permit, is fit, willing and able to do so, and that public
convenience and necessity will not be adversely affected
by change in the Permit holder.
Defendants admitted (R. 188) Mr. Young is a very
knowledgeable, experienced individual in the motor carrier
business. Young testified (R. 189) he is willing to conform to
the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission (Tr. 35).
TJie Commission took administrative notice of Pickering's
annual reports, schedule of rates and charges, and contracts
with various shippers that have been filed with the
Commission and should have made findings with respect
thereto. All of this evidence clearly proved that plaintiff
Pickering is qualified to assume the extant operating
authority.
There is no contradictory evidence. Indeed, the
defendant carriers did not contest Pickering's fitness, nor any
of the other elements of the transfer application, as to Mrs.
Murphy's Certificate of Convenience and Necessity. The
Commission's Order denied the Certificate Application
without prejudice on the sole grounds that it could not
determine if the transferee was ready, willing and able to
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operate the certificate without the permit, and that there was
no agreement by which the value of the Permit and Certificate
could be determined separately (even though the Agreement
(Ex. 1) expressly contemplates a price of $23,400 if both
authorities are transferred, or $13,400 is only the Certificate
transfer be approved). Thus, by necessary implication, the
Commission had to conclude that the transferee was qualified
and fit.
As stated in the Collett and Morris cases, supra, the
elements of proof in the case of transfer of a certificate of
convenience and necessity are:
"The financial status, fitness, willingness and ability
of the proposed new certificate holder; that so far as
the public is concerned, the public convenience and
necessity will not be adversely affected by change in
certificate holders."
Further:
"The only important question under such circumstances is that of the qualification of the prospective
certificate holder to render the necessary public
services."
In Salt Lake Transfer Co. v. Public Service Commission,
11 U.2d 121, 355 P.2d 706 (1960), this Court said:
"Realizing the limits of this court to review the
orders of the Commission, nevertheless, if in relation
to the facts before it, the Commission acts in an
arbitrary and capricious manner, the order is
without authority and must be set aside. Whatever
the minimum quantity and quality of evidence
necessary to justify administrative action, orders
issued in the complete absence of factual support are
clearly arbitrary, capricious and void."
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"The Commission cannot refuse to believe competent,
credible and uncontradicted evidence;" Lake Shore Motor
Coach Lines, Inc. v. Wetting, <d\3M 114, 339P.2d 1011 (1959).
Plaintiffs have clearly shown that the proposed corporate
transferee is qualified to conduct the contract carrier
authority without contradiction in the evidence and even
without issue being made thereto by defendants or the
Commission. Indeed, the transferee's qualification to operate
the common carrier authority was conceded by defendants.
Here the Commission made no finding that the transferee
corporation was not, and should have found that it was,
financially able, fit, willing and able to operate both the
certificate and permit authority. The only testimony was that
granting of the application would not be detrimental to the
best interests of the public and to the localities to be served,
and the Commission should have so found. Failure to so find
and conclude as to those undisputed, uncontradicted facts was
arbitrary and capricious on the Commission's part because had
the Commission found or concluded to the contrary, such
would have been arbitrary and capricious, given the utter
absence of some competent evidence to find the transferee
was not so qualified or that the transfer would be detrimental
to the best interests of the public and the localities to be
served.
In Williams v. Public Service Commission, 29 U.2d 9, 504
P.2d 34 (1972), this Court reversed the Commission's order
denying application for convenience and necessity, saying:
"If the only reasonable conclusion to be deduced from
the findings would be to grant the application, then
the refusal was arbitrary and capricious and should
be reversed. . . . By analogy, the standard rule of
review is applicable here: that the judgment or order
must find support in the findings and conversely,
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unless the findings support the judgment or order, it
cannot stand."
In Cantlay & Tanzola v. Public Service Commission, 120
Utah 217, 233 P.2d 344 (1951), the Commission granted a
contract motor carrier permit to Sanders to haul bulk
petroleum products for Standard Oil from Salt Lake to Vernal,
Sanders having conducted such haul for 20 prior years under
slightly different arrangements authorized by a different
contract carrier permit. The Commission found specifically
that the highways over which Sanders proposed to operate
were not unduly burdened, and that granting the application
would not unduly interfere with the traveling public and
would not be detrimental to the best interests of the public, as
required by statute, but did not make a finding that existing
transportation facilities were inadequate. Existing carriers
appealed on the basis that the statute required the
Commission to make a finding of inadequacy of existing
service before the application could be granted. This Court
noted: "The record is plain that the existing transportation
facilities are adequate and reasonable for hauling bulk
petroleum from Salt Lake to Vernal", but affirmed saying:
"What protestants have overlooked is the fact that
the applicant's service in transporting to Roosevelt
and distributing from there to Vernal has been and
currently is part of the existing transportation
facilities to Vernal. By its combined procedure of
operations applicant has served this shipper for
several years. The existing facilities are adequate
because I. Sander Inc. has been furnishing a portion
of such trucking service.
"The fourth provision (of the statute) states
affirmatively that the Commission shall grant a
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permit when the existing facilities are not adequate.
It does not, however, mandatorily require the
Commission to deny a permit in every instance
unless the four provisions are found in favor of the
applicant." (Emphasis and brackets added)
That is much the same case as here. Plaintiffs have shown
without contradiction that the proposed transferee is qualified
to conduct the contract carrier authority. If an element of a
contract carrier permit transfer case is really introduction of
evidence that granting of the application will not be
detrimental to the best interests of the public, then upon
uncontradicted showing that (1) the authority holder has in
fact been operating the authority, (2) that the transferee is
qualified to operate it, and (3) that because of the authority
holder's age it is desirable that the authority be transferred so
that she may retire, that ought to suffice as basis^for the
Commission to conclude that granting of the application will
not be detrimental to the best interests of the public, and any
contrary conclusion would be, and is here, arbitrary and
capricious, and should be reversed.
Defendants argued to the Commission that no shipper
witnesses supported the application. There is no such
requirement for transfer applications. Moreover, Lake Shore
Motor Lines v. Welling, supra, specifically affirmed grant of a
common carrier certificate over protestants' objection that no
shipper witnesses were required. Here, defendants made no
such contention as to plaintiffs' common carrier authority.
Consider plaintiffs particular contract carrier authority,
being general and unlimited as to any particular shipper.
Suppose plaintiff Murphy the day before hearing, had fulfilled
all existing contracts, so that on the day of the transfer
hearing, she in fact had no outstanding contracts; though she
has a right to enter into contracts in the future without
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Commission approval (Murphy v. Public Service Commission,
supra,) would the fact that no shipper could that day support
her transfer application mean she could not obtain
Commission approval for transfer of her permit? Clearly not.
That was then almost plaintiffs predicament as to her
contract permit, for on hearing day on April 6, 1973, she was
then subject to Commission order not to render contract
service to her 1972 customers and permitting her only to serve
two accounts whom she served in 1954, one of whom she then
no longer served and the other she served only occasionally.
Thus, this argument had no merit and the Commission did not
make any finding or conclusion with respect to it.
The Commission's "Findings of Fact" (R. 54-7) contain jio
real findings. Paragraph 1 recites only Mrs. Murphy's
authority; paragraph 2 recites the scope of the application
and, as shown, erroneously concludes there was no contract
per se between plaintiffs; paragraph 3 recites admission of
financial statements and equipment lists without making
findings as to what they contained, and a recital of
speculative, irrelevant testimony as to the effect of granting
the application to protestants, without stating plaintiffs
objection thereto or the Commission's ruling thereon;
paragraphs 4 and 5 merely state the parties' contentions and
arguments. Thus, the Commission failed to make any
appropriate Findings. The Commission's Conclusions do not
relate to the Findings, but instead refer to the erroneous
statement of law that applicants must prove that existing
transportation facilities are inadequate, as well as prove the
grant of application will not be detrimental to the best
interests of the public. The Commission found no facts nor was
there any evidence in the record, upon which to base the latter
conclusion, and it is apparent that the latter conclusion and
the Commission's ultimate order was based solely upon the
erroneous former conclusion.
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POINT IV. THIS COURT SHOULD DIRECT THE
COMMISSION TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS9 APPLICATION
AND SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFF COSTS FROM
DEFENDANT CARRIERS.
Based upon the foregoing points, the Commission's Order
of October 30, 1974, should be reversed. Because the
uncontested, uncontradicted evidence shows plaintiffs'
Application sh6uld have been granted, the Commission should
be specifically directed to grant the Application, particularly
considering the litigation that has thus far ensued.
Thus, in 1972, in Williams v. Public Service Commission,
supra, this Court reversed the Commission's Order denying
plaintiffs' Application for Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity, saying:
". . . we fail to see any basis in reason for the order
denying plaintiffs application. Accordingly, it is
reversed. Costs awarded to plaintiff as against
protestant."
Likewise, considering the litigation that has occurred and
upon authority of the Williams case, plaintiffs should be
awarded their costs from defendant carriers.
CONCLUSION
The only uncontradicted, uncontested evidence in the
record was that Pickering Transfer Company, Inc., a wholly
owned corporation of plaintiff Murphy, was fully qualified to
assume the aged plaintiff Murphy's operating authority. The
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Commission denied the transfer application upon the
erroneous conclusion of law that applicants for transfer of an
existing contract carrier permit must prove that existing
transportation facilities are inadequate. The Commission's
order should be reversed, with direction to the Commission to
grant plaintiffs' Application, and plaintiffs should be awarded
their costs from defendant carriers.

Respectfully submitted,

MOYLE & DRAPER
By: Joseph J. Palmer
600 Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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